What evidence is there that ISIS will continue to exist for at least the next several years?

ISIS emerged as a signficant force in the Middle East as a direct result of the Iraq parliamentary elec- tions of 2005 when, after two elec- tions Shi'a and Kurdish parties won control of the Iraqi parliament by overwhelming margins. A civil war soon began as the Sunni population would not acknowledge the legitima- cy of the parliamentary vote.

Terrorist groups played the main role in the fighting at first and in June 2005, the US began its "To- gether Forward" operations against them.

In October what we now know as ISIS appeared: consisting of some elements of the terrorist groups defeated in the civil war, including Al Qaeda in Iraq, and other subdivisions and generals of Saddam Hussein's army.

These groups differed, but they also had things in common.

Some have argued that that they fought a common enemy -- the Americans -- and aimed to expel them from Iraq.

What is much more important, however, is that they were all Sunni and enjoyed sponsorship from the Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

All felt a strong need for a counterbalance to Iran and the new Shi'a Iraq.

ISIS, and a potential Sunni state filled that bill.

The main objective of ISIS, in our view, is thus to create and con- solidate a Sunni territorial stronghold at a critical geostrategic crossroads, where the Sunni and Shi'a worlds in- tersect in Syria and Iraq.

With well-organized and coor- dinated Western opposition with re- gional allies, ISIS should not, and in our view, will not be able to spread its territories beyond that Sunni strong- hold, much less expand on the scale marked on its own "future maps.

In our view, it is very unlikely that ISIS will be able to go anywhere beyond Syria and Iraq.

ISIS may try to establish con- tact with Turkey, with or without Saudi mediation.

Erdogan in Turkey, however, is likely to behave very cautiously, as he already did during fighting between ISIS and the Kurds, while recogniz- ing the key role of Saudi Arabia.

In Iraq, ISIS may possibly try to capture Baghdad and, in the bargain, gain control of the Tigris and Euphrates, whose waters are rare and precious resources.

An ISIS march to the Gulf, however, does not seem possible in the nest few years, given the strength of Shi'a identity and the determina- tion of Shi'a populations to defend their homes, security and holy cities extremely aggresively.

ISIS relations with Syria will probably stay officially hostile. Syria seems to be safe as it is impossible for ISIS either to reach the coast or to capture Damascus.

One of the key critical assess- ments will remain relations between ISIS, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

ISIS atrocities and its clear di- vergence from fundament Moslem teaching will polarize opposition to ISIS, leaving the Islamists isolated and surrounded, facing a demise akin to those 20th-century tyrants that sought to impose their will by brutal suppression and atrocities.

Thus, ISIS may well have mas- terminded its won downfall -- by bru- tally violating all the norms of human conduct and indeed the very essence of the Prophet's words.

Cruelty, inhumanity and sheer violent atrocity have no place in the civilized world, and ISIS will real the whirlwind of its own making, unify- ing its enemies with its friends and those who will simply not tolerate inhumanity.

[For the complete, unabridged and unedited article from which this excerpt was taken see: Anthony Wells, "The Future of ISIS: A Joint US-Russian Assessment, "The Naval Review CIII (May 2015), pp. 142-146)]